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Abstract
The world of counterfeit goods is diverse and has grown rapidly throughout the years. The boom
of e-commerce has resulted in a devastating increase in the shipment of small packages into the
United States, making it easier for every day consumers to be fooled by counterfeiting
masterminds. Counterfeit goods are not limited to fake watches and designer purses offered on
the streets of Los Angeles or New York City anymore, instead the market has expanded to
include many goods like consumer electronics, footwear, apparel, cosmetics, and even medicines
and personal care items. Advances in technology at border control points, advertising campaigns
that promote the negative effects of counterfeiting to educate consumers, and industry leaders
having more control over their suppliers are some of the many effective strategies in the fight
against counterfeiting, but what about the effects of international trade and the role of tariffs.
This paper examines the relationship between import tariffs and the flow of industrial (nonagricultural) counterfeit goods into the United States.

1. The World of Counterfeit Goods
1.1 Background
The International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) defines counterfeiting as a federal
and state crime that involves the manufacturing or distribution of goods under someone else’s
name without their permission. The IACC states that counterfeit goods are usually made from
lower quality components, and sold to imitate similar goods that are produced by brands that
consumers know and trust. To put it simply, counterfeit goods are fake goods that are sold
illegally. Many steps have been taken by the IACC, the US Department of Homeland Security,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), etc., to
combat the counterfeit goods crisis; however, their efforts are not enough to stop this trillion
dollar industry. Demand and supply side actions can, and are, being taken to reduce the amount
of counterfeit goods entering the US, but what impact do tariffs make on the rate of trade in this
illegal market?
This paper will focus on the impact of tariffs on counterfeit goods with respect to data on
trade and tariffs between the United States and China. China is the source of the highest amount
of customs seizures for counterfeit goods; therefore, this paper investigates the impact of the
trade wars between the United States and China on the amount of counterfeit goods entering the
United States. I used data on the annual seizures of counterfeit goods as a reference for the level
of counterfeiting taking place. It is difficult to calculate the estimated production of
counterfeiting each year because this is an illegal market; therefore, I chose to use seizure data.
Annual seizures fluctuate for many reasons such as; an increase in border security and
technology, track and trace tactics, and efforts to track down counterfeiters from legitimate
manufacturers. Understanding that many things impact the level of annual seizures, this research
presents data that shows an inverse relationship exists between import tariffs that are imposed on
goods entering the US from China, and counterfeit goods in the Apparel (Clothing and Textiles)
product segment.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Growth of Counterfeit Goods
Trade in counterfeit and pirated physical goods is an estimated $1.7 trillion a year
industry (International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, 2019). In 2013, the value of imported fake
goods worldwide was $461B (Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic
Impact, 2016) and just three years later in 2016, that number grew to a staggering $509B (Trends
in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 2019). Counterfeit goods range from apparel and
clothing accessories, footwear, and toys to goods that can physically harm consumers like fake
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, auto parts, and skincare products. Consumers aren’t the only ones at
a loss when it comes to counterfeit goods, the International Chamber of Commerce projects that
globally, net job loss will be between 4.2 to 5.4 million by 2022 due to counterfeiting and piracy
(Economics, 2016). With no end in site, trade in counterfeit and pirated physical goods continues
to steadily rise, representing 3.3% of global trade (OECD, 2019).
As online shopping becomes a staple in households across America, counterfeit goods
are finding their way into consumer hands at an alarming rate. Third-party platforms are an ideal
method of transaction for counterfeiters due to the ease of access to consumers and the lack of

control from legitimate brands to police fake goods. The popularity of e-commerce has led to a
sharp increase in the shipment of small packages into the United States (US Customs and Border
Protection, 2018). Consumers can purchase items that are delivered straight to their doors, often
without the proper security screening due to the sheer amount of packages that move through
commercial postal carriers.
US companies that are trying to protect their products and fight the production and sale of
counterfeit goods often find themselves at a loss. Manufacturers of counterfeit goods can be
difficult to track because they often use shell companies and ship their products from subcontractors to avoid detection. Legal action is very difficult for American companies because ecommerce counterfeiters are usually located outside of the US jurisdiction, often residing in
China (Homeland Security, 2020).
2.2 Trade with China
China is currently the United States’ largest trader of goods. In 2018, total trade with
China was worth an estimated $659.8B with exports totaling $120.3B and imports of $539.5B, a
deficit of $419.2B (The People’s Republic of China, 2020). Figure 1, from BBC News, shows
the trade deficit between the United States and China from 1985 to 2018. The top import
categories of goods from China in 2018 were: electrical machinery, machinery, furniture and
bedding, toys and sports equipment, and plastics. US imports from China accounted for 21.2% of
all US imports in 2018 (The People’s Republic of China, 2020). Research discusses the high
levels of trade with China and the impact this has on the amount of counterfeit goods entering
the United States. The high level of counterfeiting in China is due to the considerable amount of
outsourcing taking place there, China’s high level of organized crime, the lack of intellectual
property rights in China, and the willingness of Chinese consumers to buy counterfeit goods
(Chaudhry, 2009).
Mainland China and Hong Kong dominate the world of counterfeit goods and they
remain the primary source of counterfeit and pirated goods seizures in the United States. In 2019,
The People’s Republic of China was at fault for a total of 66% of all counterfeit seizures in the
US, a total estimated value of over $1B in counterfeit goods (US Customs and Border Protection,
2019). In 2018, Mainland China accounted for 46% of total seizures with Hong Kong coming in
at a close second at 41% (Homeland Security, 2018). The sharp increase of 20% in counterfeit
seizures coming from China, correlates to the beginning of the tariff war between the Trump
Administration and China.
In March 2018, a report by the United States Trade Representative concluded that China
was conducting unfair trade practices. That same day, the war on tariffs began. Figure 2, from
BBC News, gives a visual of the tariffs placed on China and the retaliatory tariffs imposed on the
US in 2018 and 2019. The United States is currently imposing tariffs on more than $360B worth
of Chinese imports, 25% tariff on $250B and 7.5% on $112B (York, 2020). China has retaliated
and currently holds tariffs on approximately $75B of US goods at a rate of 2.5% and 5% (York,
2020). So what effect do these tariffs have on US consumers in the market for counterfeit goods?
2.3 Consumer Role
Consumers play a vital role in deciding the amount of counterfeit goods being imported
into the United States; with fluctuating preferences and changes in income, consumer demand for

counterfeit goods has increased in the last few decades. Previous research examines the complex
purchasing process that involves: consumer-brand relationships, personality traits, impulse buys,
conforming to social norms, etc., (Randhawa, Calantone, & Voorhees, 2015) and explains how
understanding the connection between a consumer and a brand is vital when it comes to
combating luxury brand counterfeiting. If a consumers main goal is to comply with social norms
and find themselves in the ‘in crowd,' they will go to whatever lengths they deem necessary
including deliberately purchasing counterfeit goods. This is a red flag when it comes to the fight
against counterfeit goods. If consumers are always going to demand fake goods, nothing the
government or firms do will make a difference.
Counterfeiting can either be deceptive, consumers unknowingly purchase a counterfeit
good because they cannot easily distinguish it from a genuine item; or non-deceptive, consumers
knowingly purchase a product that is fake (Grossman & Shapiro, 1988). Consumers who
deliberately purchase counterfeit goods do so for price affordability and to boost their
socioeconomic status. Some economists have questioned whether counterfeiting is creating real
losses since the consumers who are purchasing counterfeit goods are doing so due to their
inability to afford the genuine product, and there is no guarantee they would contribute to the real
market if the counterfeit good did not exist (Chaudry, 2009). As legitimate companies work to
combat counterfeiters by making their products harder to replicate, ultimately increasing the
price per item, consumers find themselves hunting for cheaper alternatives which are often
counterfeit goods.
2.4 Combatting Counterfeiting
As previously mentioned, counterfeit goods are a risk to consumers, employees of
legitimate companies, brand trust, and even source countries as they may see a reduction in on
long term foreign direct investment due to counterfeit activity (Chaudry, 2009). Protection from
counterfeiting ranges from the front lines with US Customs and Border Protection; to US laws
like the Tariff Act of 1930, the Lanham Act, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, and the
Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act of 2006. See the article Preserving Intellectual
Property Rights (Chaudry, 2009) for an in-depth look at the various approaches to fighting
counterfeiters and the most frequently used tactics.
With the numerous laws and international agreements in the fight to end the production
of counterfeit goods, educating the consumer does not seem to get the attention it deserves.
Current literature focuses on US industries protecting their products by making them more
difficult to replicate and using track and trace technology; however, the consumer needs to be
aware of the risks with buying, knowingly or unknowingly, fake goods. The article, Strategies to
detect and reduce counterfeiting activity by Barry Berman, was one of the few that explained the
education process needed to make the public aware of the signs of counterfeit goods. He also
explained the responsibility of marketers and how advertising campaigns that explain the
financial risks and safety to consumers, would benefit the fight to end counterfeiting. Berman
points out that an effective strategy to detect and reduce counterfeiting activity has several key
components including; the importance of early detection, firms budgeting for counterfeit
deterrence and the removal of counterfeit merchandise from the market, the firms ability to
monitor the internet and manage outsourcing, and consumer education.

The US Food and Drug Administration, as well as, US Customs and Border Protection,
have created public service announcements to inform the public of the dangers of counterfeit
goods. The US is doing a great deal to combat counterfeiters, but there are many more resources
that can be utilized. Aggressive advertising can be used to explain how purchasing counterfeit
goods often leads to the funding of organized crime and drug trafficking. Consumers do not have
the realistic picture of the connection between their fake Louis Vuitton purse and the direct
impact that purchase has on organized crime in the country it was produced in. The fight against
counterfeit goods needs to take an aggressive approach to advertising, similar to the anti-tobacco
ads of the late 1990s. Future research should examine the effect of shock advertising what effect
there is if consumers are constantly bombarded with the truth behind counterfeit goods, how
likely would they be to deliberately purchase them.
Berman discusses an early warning system that alerts firms that counterfeit goods exist
for their products; however, he states that an important component of such a system is for final
consumers to report the suspected goods. This is putting a certain level of responsibility on the
consumer to report suspected counterfeit goods, which they may not be aware of. An early
warning system was not common among other research, but it should be implemented in the
world of e-commerce. If consumers were asked if the item they purchased is a suspected
counterfeit good every time they shopped online, companies would have an immediate
notification and a better chance of tracking down counterfeiters.

3. Models and Data
Table 1 is a collection of fiscal year seizures from the US Customs and Border Protection
annual Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Reports. This data shows the amount of seizures
each year from 2013 to 2019; with the total estimated manufacturer’s retail price (MSRP), or
value, of the seized items. The table also includes the most common product that was seized and
what percent of total seizures that product accounts for. Finding the percent change of seizures
from one year to the next shows the increase, and decrease, of seizures over time. A key figure is
the decrease from 2018 to 2019 of 18.4% during the tariff wars between the US and China, and
interestingly, Apparel and Accessories is no longer the front runner in product segment for
counterfeit seizures.
Table 2 is a collection of data from the World Bank showing the import tariffs placed on
Textiles and Clothing from China from 2013 to 2018, matching the years of seizure data from
Table 1. Year 2019 data was not available on the site; however, below the table I have included
data on the tariffs imposed on China in 2019 and 2020. The Trump Administration imposed 15%
tariffs on $120B worth of goods from China in 2019, then reduced that tariff to 7.5% in 2020. It
is difficult to find data on the exact product segment; therefore, referencing Figure 3, we see that
there are two categories for apparel. One category has a tariff of 18.7% and the other is 15.8%.
Apparel is a high tariff product segment, so I will use the rate of 15% for 2019 and assume a
drop to 7.5% in 2020 to match the Trump Administration decisions.
I am focusing on the Textiles and Clothing product market since Apparel and Clothing
has consecutively been the leading product of counterfeit seizures, and the purpose of this data is
to observe the effect of import tariffs on counterfeit goods entering the United States.

Table 3 is a collection of data from the International Trade Administration, on imports of
Apparel from China. We can assume that the level of counterfeit goods entering the US follows
the fluctuation in imports; therefore, I will use this data to measure the impact of tariffs on the
level of imports from China.
Figure 1 is a graph of the US and China trade deficit mentioned previously in this paper.
Figure Two is a visual of the dollar value of the US imposed tariffs on imported Chinese goods,
as well as, the retaliatory tariffs from China from July 2018 to June 2019. This timeline shows
the escalation in the tariff wars previously mentioned in this paper.
Figure 3, from an article by PEW Research (DeSilver, 2018), shows that the largest
categories of US imports tend to have relatively low tariff rates, with the exception of ‘Apparel
and clothing accessories’. The purpose of including this chart is to show that the two categories
of ‘Apparel and clothing accessories’ accounted for $80.6B worth of imports in 2017, making up
3.5% of total imports, with nearly $64B of those imports subject to duty. The average tariffs on
the ‘Apparel and clothing accessories’ category were 18.7% and 15.8% (knitted or crocheted vs
not knitted or crocheted); these two rates were the highest out of the hundreds of import
categories for goods entering the US. Footwear is the other category to notice in this chart
because it is one of the most popular items being seized, after apparel, for counterfeit goods by
US Customs and Border Protection every year. This chart shows that nearly 95% of footwear
entering the US is subject to duty at a rate of 11.9%. This chart connects the two highest tariff
rates to two of the most popular products that are subject to counterfeiting.
Figure 4 is a scatter plot that shows the correlation between the annual seizure data in
Table 1, and the import tariff rates from Table 2. This scatter plot explains that an increase in
tariffs correlates to a decrease in counterfeit goods seizures.

4. Results
This research shows that an inverse relationship exists between import tariffs placed on
China in the Apparel (Clothing and Textiles) product segment, and the amount of counterfeit
goods seizures in the United States. Based on the data presented, as import tariffs rise,
counterfeit goods seizures fall. I am equating seizures to the level of counterfeit goods entering
the United States. This phenomenon follows the inverse effect that tariffs normally have on
imports; tariffs increase the price of imported goods and domestic consumers are left paying
higher prices as a result therefore demanding less imported goods. As stated previously, customs
seizure data can fluctuate based on an increase in border security; however, for this paper I am
holding all other variables constant and purely observing the relationship between counterfeit
seizures and tariffs.
Table 1 shows the decline in seizures from 2018 to 2019 of 18.4% which correlates to an
increase in tariffs from 10.92% to 15%. In 2019, the decline in imports of Apparel from China is
around 36% and we can assume this reduction in trade is also a reduction in the ability to move
counterfeit goods into the United States. Figure 4 includes the R-squared value of 0.0417. RSquared is a statistical measure that explains to what extent the variance of one variable (import
tariffs), explains the variance of the second variable (seizures). R-Squared is always between 0
and 100% with 0% indicating that the model explains none of the variability of the response data

around its mean; therefore, the R-Squared value of 0.0417 shows the very minimal effect that
tariffs have on counterfeit seizures.

5. Conclusion
Higher tariffs on Apparel items have reduced the amount of imports into the United
States as well as the amount of counterfeit good seizures; however, there is not a strong enough
relationship of tariff rates to counterfeit good seizures to state that a decrease in seizures is solely
due to an increase in tariffs. Prior to this research I assumed that an increase in tariffs would
increase the amount of counterfeit good seizures because domestic prices will increase with
higher tariffs, and consumers will search for cheaper alternatives that are usually fake. I assumed
that the demand for counterfeit goods would rise with an increase in tariffs because consumers
cannot afford, or do not want to pay, the price for legitimate goods. It is difficult to measure the
definite impact that raising or lowering import tariffs will have on the amount of counterfeit
goods entering the United States because it is an illegal industry and widely untraceable. It is
safe to assume that increasing tariffs, resulting in higher prices for goods, will decrease the level
of imports into the United States, real or fake, and reduce the burden on US Customs and Border
Protection in their effort to find counterfeit goods.
In order to combat the inflow of counterfeit goods into the United States, consumers need
to be smarter. The government, industry leaders, and firms must all play their part in educating
the consumer and making them aware of the effects of purchasing counterfeit goods. Counterfeit
goods stop at the consumer; if there is no demand for the fake goods then they will cease to exist.
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Tables
Table 1
Fiscal Year Seizures

Seizures

Percent Change
from Previous
Year

Total Estimated
Manufacturer’s
Suggested Retail
Price (MSRP)

Top Product Seized
(% of all Seizures)

2019

27,599

-18.4%

$1.5B

Watches and
Jewelry (15%)

2018

33,810

-0.1%

$1.4B

Apparel/
Accessories (18%)

2017

34,143

8.2%

$1.2B

Apparel/
Accessories (15%)

2016

31,560

9.3%

$1.4B

Apparel/
Accessories (20%)

2015

28,865

24.7%

$1.3B

Apparel/
Accessories (22%)

2014

23,140

-5%

$1.2B

Apparel/
Accessories (28%)

2013

24,361

—

$1.7B

Apparel/
Accessories (35%)

FY

Table 2
Textiles and Clothing Import Tariff’s Placed on China

FY

Total Import Value of
Textiles and Clothing
(Thousands)

Percent of Imports that
Import Tariff Imposed on
are Textiles and
Textiles and Clothing
Clothing

2020

No data

No data

7.5%*

2019

No data

No data

15%*

2018

$42,479,673.90

7.54%

10.92%

2017

$40,849,010.19

7.77%

10.61%

2016

$41,243,182.43

8.57%

11.01%

2015

$44,601,796.97

8.85%

11.06%

2014

$43,036,931.73

8.85%

11.02%

2013

$40,714,714.38

9.25%

10.98%

*Data for 2019 was not available on this website; however, on February 14, 2020, the US
reduced the 15% tariffs on Chinese goods by half to 7.5% (York, 2020).

Table 3
Apparel Imports to US from China

Year

Percent Change in Imports from Year-to-Date (Jan)

Jan 2019-Jan 2020

-36.09%

Jan 2018-Jan 2019

8.53%

Jan 2017-Jan 2018

-7.24%

Jan 2016-Jan 2017

4.63%

Jan 2015-Jan 2016

2.67%

Jan 2014-Jan 2015

-10.30%

Jan 2013-Jan 2014

3.90%
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